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Averch and Johnson have provided analytical support for the 
assertion that rate of return regulation causes inefficient pro-
duction because of the overuse of capital. Empirical evidence in 
support or refutation of their thesis is just beginning to appear. 
This paper provides additional evidence. The regulated firm's 
objective is stated in terms of cost minimization subject to a 
regulatory constraint. The effect of changes in the allowed rate 
of return on capital are evaluated. It is shown that as the 
allowed return approaches the cost of capital, costs increase 
and the percentage of total costs paid to capital also increases. 
These are testable implications of the revised A-J model. Data 
on costs, input prices, and output are collected for electric 
power production. Three measures of regulatory policy with 
regard to the allowed return are formulated. Econometric 
analysis suggests that lower allowed rates of return are 
significantly associated with higher costs and larger proportions 
of cost going to capital. These findings are consistent with the 
revised A-J model and with those of other recent investigators . 
• Price regulation of electric power in the United States is 
accomplished by using a rate of return on capital criterion. The 
individual firm is allowed to charge prices which will allow it to 
recover its expenses while also earning a fair rate of return on its 
capital base. 
Price changes to be allowed by a commission are determined 
in a rate case. The rate case is a quasi-judicial proceeding which 
determines the firm's present revenues, expenses, capital or rate 
base, and rate of return in relation to a test period (usually the 
latest twelve-month period for which data are available). The 
rate case also determines the appropriate or fair rate of return. If 
the rate of return earned by the firm in the test period is less 
than the fair rate of return, then the firm will be allowed to raise 
prices. If the return is greater than the fair return, a reduction 
in prices may be ordered. The new prices which the commission 
will allow are set such that they generate sufficient revenues to 
allow the firm to pay its expenses plus earn the fair rate of return 
on its rate base. Thus, regulation can be considered as a cost 
plus profit process. 
H. Craig Petersen received the B.S. in economics and computer science 
from Utah State University in 1968 and the Ph.D. in economics from Stanford 
University in 1973. Currently he is studying the impact of particular regulatory 
policies on the operations of utilities and the economic. institutional. and legal 
aspects of solar energy. 
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There are significant differences among the states regarding 
the particulars of their regulatory procedures. Some states have 
large, active regulatory commissions, while others have small, 
poorly staffed commissions which have rarely required rate 
adjustments. 1 In some states the regulation of electric power 
rates is done on a local rather than a statewide basis. At the 
present time Texas, South Dakota, and Minnesota do not have 
statewide commissions. Until 1966, Iowa also regulated electric 
power on a local basis. The record of local commission regula-
tion is rather poor; its demise attests to that fact. It is a main-
tained hypothesis of this paper that local regulation is less effec-
tive than that done on a statewide basis. 2 
For many years students of regulation have argued that the 
cost-plus type of regulation used in the United States does not 
provide utilities with much incentive to be efficient in their 
provision of service. In their 1962 article, Averch and Johnson 
(A-J)3 give analytical support for the proposition that such regu-
lation tends to result in inefficient production. Starting with the 
assumptions of no regulatory lag, profit maximization, and an 
allowed rate of return greater than the cost of capital, they 
demonstrate that the firm has an incentive to use more capital in 
production than would be dictated by strict cost minimization. A 
substantial literature has accumulated which extends and refines 
the basic A-J idea. 4 
Intuitively, what occurs is that the firm is constrained as to 
the amount of total profits it may earn, and seeks means of 
circumventing the regulatory constraint. This is accomplished 
by overutilizing capital. Since the firm is assumed to be allowed 
to earn more on each additional unit of capital employed than 
the cost of that capital to the firm, up to some point profits are 
increased by substitution of capital for the other input, labor. 
Another way of looking at the result is to view the excess 
return, s-PK , where s is the allowed return and PK is the cost of 
capital, as a subsidy granted to the use of capital. The firm in its 
decision making maximizes profits by using each input until its 
value in production equals its cost, but because each unit of 
capital is subsidized, the firm does not use the market cost of 
capital in the decision process, but some shadow price of capital 
less than PK • Capital is used until the value of its marginal 
product is driven down to this shadow price. In this view, the 
firm behaves in the same manner as any profit-maximizing firm, 
but uses a different capital price. 
In spite of the potential importance of the Averch and John-
son result, empirical support or refutation has been slow in 
coming. First to be published were articles by Spann and by 
1 See Clark, Dodge. and Co. [5] or Federal Power Commission [9] for 
infOImation on commission composition and policies. 
2 See Reschenthaler [16] for one of the few published discussions on the 
nature of municipal regulation. The ineffectiveness of local regulation is consid-
ered in most texts on the economics of regulation. See Phillips [IS], for 
example. 
3 In [I]. 
4 The most comprehensive of the A-J publications are those by Bailey [2] 
and by Baumol and Klevorick [4). 
Courville. 5 Both confirm the existence of A-J type inefficiency. 
The objective of this paper is to add to the emerging body of 
empirical evidence on the effect of rate of return regulation. 
• In this section the A verch-J ohnson analysis is reformulated in 
terms of cost minimization subject to technology and regula-
tory constraints. The effect of changes in the allowed return on 
capital on costs and input choice is investigated. It is shown 
that costs increase for the production of any given level of 
output as the allowed return approaches the cost of capital. It is 
also demonstrated that the use of capital and the proportion of 
total costs paid to capital increase as regulation becomes more 
stringent. 
For the unconstrained firm, a necessary condition for 
profit-maximization is that the cost of producing the chosen 
level of output be minimized subject to the constraint imposed 
by existing technology. A similar requirement holds for the 
regulated profit-maximizing firm, but with the additional 
qualification that, in minimizing costs, the profit limitation must 
not be violated. That is, the firm must choose inputs such that 
the difference between production costs and revenues generated 
from the chosen output does not exceed the allowed rate of 
return per unit of capital employed. The regulated firm attempts 
to circumvent the regulatory constraint by incorporating into its 
costs a higher expenditure on capital than would be used on a 
strict cost minimization criterion. 
Formally stated, the problem of the firm is to minimize 
C = PLL + PKK + PFF 
subject to the production technology constraint, 
Q(K, F, L) ~ Q, 
and the regulatory constraint, 




where L, K, and F are labor, capital, and fuel inputs, the Pi are 
input prices, Q is the chosen level of output, s is the allowed 
return on capital, and R is total revenue, PQ. 
The production function, Q(K,F,L) is taken to be quasi-
concave with QL ~ 0, QK ~ 0, and QF ~ 0. It is assumed that 
each input is required for production: Q(O, F, L) = Q(K, 0, 
L) = Q(K, F, 0) = 0. Also, the A-J assumption of s-PK > ° is 
adopted. The author has considered the strength of this assump-
tion in an earlier paper. 6 Both the regulatory constraint and the 
production function constraint are assumed binding for the re-
mainder of the discussion. Thus, the relationships (2) and (3) 
hold as equalities. 
The problem is solved by using the Lagrangian multiplier 
method. The Lagrangian is 
:£ = -PLL - PFF - PKK + v[-Q +Q(K, F, L)] 
5 In [17) and [6), respectively. 
6 See [13). 
+ iI.(sK + PLL + PFF - R), (4) 
2. Theoretical model 
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where v and A are Lagrangian multipliers, and are interpreted as 
the change in the optimum value of the objective function for a 
change in the constant of the associated constraint. 
The first-order conditions are: 
- P L + AP L + VQL = 0 
-PL + APF + VQF = 0 
-PK + As + VQK = 0 
R - PFF - PLL - s K = 0 
Q - Q(K, F, L) = 0 
K > 0, L > 0, F > 0, V> 0, A > o. 
Consider equation (5), which can be written as 








Since v, QL, and PL are all nonnegative, then 1 - A ;:3 0 and 
A ~ 1. If A = 1, that implies [by equation (7)] that 
P K - S = VQK ;:3 O. But this in turn requires P K ;:3 s, which con-
tradicts the assumption that s > PK • Thus, 0 < A < 1. 
Since s > PK, then As > APK and -As < - APK. Adding PK 
to each side, PK - As < PK - APK. Dividing by 1 - A gives: 
(PK - As)/(1 - A) < PK • (12) 
Equations (5), (6), and (7) imply the following relationships: 
QFIQK = PFI(PK - As)/(1 - A) 
QdQK = PL/(PK - As)/(1 - A) 




The term (PK - As)/(1 - A) can be interpreted as the implicit 
or shadow price of capital used by the constrained firm in its 
decision process. In that this price is less than the market price, 
PK , capital is used more intensively in production of Q than 
would be the case if the firm were allowed unconstrained cost 
minimization. Intuitively, what occurs is that the firm must 
increase its allowable profits (sK) if the regulatory constraint is 
not to be violated. By substituting capital for other inputs, total 
allowable profits are increased because the base to which s is 
applied is expanded. Thus, while costs, PKK + PLL + Pl'F, do 
increase, the constraint is in a sense relaxed, and the opportun-
ity set of the firm in terms of total allowable profits is expanded. 
Equations (8), (13), (14), and (15) form a system of four 
equations in four unknowns, K*, L *, F*, A *, where the asterisks 
denote the optimum values of the variables. These equations can 
be solved, at least conceptually, in terms of the parameters of 
the system; Q, PK, PL, Pl" and s. The optimum input bundle for 
the constrained firm is given by: 
K* = K(Q, PL, PF, PK, s) 
L* = L(Q, PL, Pl' , PK, s) 




Since C* = P LL * + P FF* + P KK*, equations (16), (17), and (18) 
imply 
(19) 
Equation (19) is the general relationship from which the statisti-
cal models of Section 3 are derived. 
The effect of changes in s on the cost which the firm incurs 
to produce the output Q can be determined by differentiating the 
Lagrangian expression (4) with respect to s: 
a::£/as = AK. (20) 
The first-order conditions for an optimum guarantee that the 
value of the Lagrangian, ::£, at K*, L * , F* , and A * is always equal 
to the value of the objective function, -C, for all s. Thus 
a::£/as = a( -C)/as = AK (21) 
and 
aCias = -AK. (22) 
Since A > 0 and K > 0, it follows that aCias < o. 
The result is a testable hypothesis of the Averch-Johnson 
model. If quantity and input prices are held constant, then the 
cost of production increases as regulation becomes tighter, that 
is, as s approaches PK • 
It is possible that the inverse relationship between costs and 
the allowed rate of return may exist for reasons other than that 
proposed by Averch and Johnson. For instance, it has been 
asserted that regulation reduces the incentive to be efficient. It is 
possible that costs may increase in tightly regulated jurisdictions 
because of an input neutral shift of the cost function as man-
agement becomes more lax. Additional implications of the 
model are derived to differentiate neutral upward shifts of the 
cost function stemming from managerial indifference from cost 
increases resulting from profit-maximizing management's at-
tempts to circumvent the regulatory constraint. 
Consider first the model's implications regarding d(PKK/C)/ds, 
or the change in the percent of total cost going to capital for a 
change in the allowed rate of return, with output held constant. 
Note that 
d(PKK/C)/ds = PKK ( dK/ds _ dC/ds ) (23) 
C K C' 
which indicates that the percent spent on capital increases if the 
percentage change in capital used in production is greater than 
the percentage change in total cost. 
Since C = PKK + PLL + PFF, then 
dC/ds = PLdLids + PFdF/ds + PKdK/ds. (24) 
Substituting (24) into (25) gives 
= ~K [(dK/ds) ( C -ilK 
(25) TEST OF 
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Since C - PKK > 0, if it can be shown that dKlds < 0 and 
PLdLids + PFdFlds > 0, then it is also true that 
d(PKKIC)ds < O. These relationships are investigated using 
comparative statics procedures. 
Differentiating the first-order conditions of the model com-
pletely with respect to K, F, L, s, A, and v generates the 
following system of equations: 
[
;; ~ ~:: ~:~:] [:;;~] = [1,] 
o 0 PL S PF dKlds -K 
o 0 QL QK QF dF Ids 0 
(26) 
Solving by Cramer's rule gives 
dKlds = KQd(QKIs - QLIPL)PLS. (27) 
But QKIs - QdPL is negative by (14), hence dKlds < O. As regu-
lation tightens, the firm uses more and more capital to produce 
the output Q. 
The expressions for dLlds and dFlds can be derived in a 
similar manner. Their signs, however, cannot be specified with-
out additional assumptions. Fortunately, equation (25) requires 
only that the sign of PLdLids + PFdFlds be determined. A tedi-
ous number of algebraic operations results in 
PKdLlds + PFdFlds = -KQKIs(QKIs - QLIPL), (28) 
which is positive by (14). Thus PLdLids + PFdFlds > 0 and 
dKlds < O. Hence, by equation (25), it is known that 
d(PKKIC)lds is negative. 
By way of review, it is asserted that if the A-J analysis is a 
meaningful description of the behavior of the constrained firm, 
then the following relationships hold for production of the level 
of output Q: 
dClds < 0 (29) 
and 
d(PKKIC)lds < o . (30) 
• Previous empirical researchers have investigated the electric 
power industry. 7 These studies, taken together, provide a 
framework for the choice of a functional form for this analysis. 
The basic properties which will be required of the chosen form 
are that it allow for increasing (and changing) returns to scale, 
that it be amenable to estimation using three factors (capital, 
labor, and fuel), that it be augmentable by a technological 
change parameter, and that it not impose a priori restrictions 'on 
elasticities of substitution between factors. Also, as a statistical 
convenience, it should be estimable by standard linear methods. 
The three common functional forms used in the estimation of 
cost and production functions are the linear form, the Cobb-
7 See the studies by Barzel [3], Dhrymes andnKurz [7], and Nerlove [12]. 
Other studies are listed in Petersen [14]. 
Douglas form, and the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
form. Each of these is deficient with respect to at least one of 
the above criteria. 
In this analysis, rather than begin with a definite functional 
form, we consider the general cost function 
InC = aT + C(lnX1 , lnX2 , ••• , lnXn), (31) 
where the X; are the arguments of the cost function (the input 
prices, output levels, and regulatory variables), and aT allows 
for input neutral technological change. That is, it is allowed that 
the log of cost of producing a given output may shift by some 
factor aT over time. 
The exact functional form of equation (31) is not known, but, 
following the procedure adopted by Jorgenson, Christensen, and 
Lau,s we assume that the true functional form can be approxi-
mated sufficiently accurately for the purpose at hand by a 
second-order Taylor series approximation of (31) about 
lnX = [0], where X is a column vector of the X;, and [0] is an 
n-element column vector of zeros: 
InC = aT + C(lnX = [0)) + f ~I . lnX; (32) 
i=l aInX; 1nX=[0] 
+ -L L a C . InX;lnXh 1 n n 2 I 
2;=lj=1 aInS;alnXj 1nX=[0] 
where 11nX = [0] indicates that the derivatives are to be evaluated 
at InX; = 0 for all i and j. 
Denote the constant terms as 
C(lnX = [0)) = a' 0 
ac I ' for all ; 
alnX; 1nX = [0] = a i 
a
2
c I = y'ij for all i andj. 
a InXia InXj 1nX = [0] 




n 1 n n 
InC = a'o + aT + La'iInX; + - L LY'ijlnX;lnXj . (36) 
;=1 2 ;=1 j=l 
In that the expansion is about zero, the accuracy of the 
approximation depends on how closely each lnX; approaches 
zero. The approximation error can be minimized by setting the 
mean of each Xi to unity. This is done using the normalization, 
for each i, (37) 
where X ik is the kth observation of the ith variable, and m is the 
number of observations. For the logs of X'i to be well defined, it 
is necessary that each X;k be positive. 
The functional form of (36) has 2 + (n12)(n + 3) coefficients 
to be estimated. It imposes few a priori restrictions on the 
" In [Ill. 
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parameters. Returns to scale cannot only be increasing, but can 
vary for different levels of output. The elasticity of substitution 
varies between inputs and for different levels of input usage. 
Technological change has been incorporated, and the model is 
easily estimable by simple linear methods. Thus, all of the re-
quirements of functional form indicated by previous studies are 
satisfied. 9 
In terms of the variables of Section 2, equation (36) becomes 
InC' = ao + aT + Q{JInQ' + aLInP'L + aFInP'F + aKInP'K 
+ aRIn«s - PK)') + 'YQQ(lnQ'F + 'YLL(lnP'L)2 
+ 'YKK(InP'K)2 + 'YFF(lnP'F)2 + 'YRR[ln«s - PK)')F 
+ 'YQLInQ'lnP'L + 'YQFlnQ'lnP'F + 'YQKInQ'lnP'K 
+ 'YQRInQ'In«s - PK)') + 'YLKInP'LInP'K 
+ 'YLF InP'L InP'F + 'YLR InP'L In«s - PK)') 
+ 'YKF InP'K InP'F + 'YKR InP'K In«s - PK)') 
+ 'YFRlnP'Fln«s - PK)'), (38) 
where the primes denote the normalized variables as given by 
equation (37), T is an index of technology, the Pi are input 
prices, Q is quantity, and s - PK is the difference between the 
allowed rate of return and the cost of capital, or "regulatory 
tightness." Equation (38) is the basic equation for determining 
the effect of regulation on unit costs. 
N ext we consider the percentage of total expenditure going 
to capital. The estimating equation chosen is 
PKKIC = bo + bQ InQ' + bQQ (lnQ')2 + bK InP'K 
+ bFlnP'F + bLInP'L + bRln«s - PK)'). (39) 
The theoretical model of Section 2 predicts that bR should be 
negative if an A-J effect is operative. 
The statistical analysis is carried out using ordinary least 
squares (OLS). Behind the OLS methodology is the assumption 
that all variables on the right-hand side of equations (38) and (39) 
are either exogenous or predetermined. The presence of en-
dogenous variables generates estimates of the coefficients which 
are biased. The Pi are exogenous as is s if the political influence 
of the firm on the commission is taken to be negligible. The 
quantity terms require some discussion. If there is no A-J effect, 
that is if the firm does not manipulate costs in the attempt to 
circumvent the regulatory constraint, then technology dictates 
costs and the price set by the commission is determined by 
technology and the allowed rate of return. Quantity as a function 
of price is, thus, exogenous to the firm. On the other hand, if 
tighter regulation results in higher costs, then the firm may be 
able to manipulate price and, hence, quantity. Note that as s 
decreases, costs increase. It is assumed that, if an A-J effect is 
operative, the two are offsetting, and the price fixed by the 
commission remains unchanged in equilibrium. Thus, quantity is 
exogenous to the firm. Such a result is a possible explanation for 
Stigler-Friedland's finding 10 that regulation had no effect on 
9 The properties of functional forms such as (38) are discussed in Jorgenson, 
Christensen, and Lau [II]. 
10 In [18]. 
prices. In a related study!! the author has relaxed the assump-
tion of quantity being exogenous and, using a simultaneous 
equation model and a different data set, tested for the A-J effect. 
The results are consistent with those of this analysis. 
• The sample consists of fifty-six steam generating plants 
which experienced at least a fifty-percent expansion during the 
period 1960 to 1965. These are observed over the three-year 
period, 1966 to 1968. The selection of plants which significantly 
expanded capacity is dictated by the theoretical model which is 
derived in marginal terms. The analysis suggests that regulation 
causes planners to choose excessively capital-intensive produc-
tion. Only in plants where capacity is being added is there much 
possibility for capital-other input substitution. Ex post substitu-
tion in the industry is probably very limited. 
The dependent variable used in estimation of (38) is the log 
of cost of production per unit of output in terms of dollars per 
thousand KWH. The dependent variable associated with (39) is 
the percent of total cost going to capital. 
Output is in terms of millions of KWH of power. Fuel price 
is given as cost per million British Thermal Units of energy. The 
wage rate is expressed as dollars per year per employee. The 
capital price is formulated in terms of the annual rental price of 
capital as suggested by Jorgenson.!2 That is, 
PK = q(r + 8 - q), (40) 
where q is the price of equipment, r is the interest rate, 8 is the 
rate of depreciation, and q the rate of price change for equip-
ment. An index of technology is constructed by determining the 
computed average time that capital had been in service. A 
dummy variable is included to distinguish plants which are 
owned by firms which are part of interstate holding companies. 
Participation in holding companies may be considered to be an 
additional scale variable. 
Tightness of regulation proved difficult to quantify. Three 
measures are used in the analysis. First, as has been noted, four 
states during the study period did not have statewide regulatory 
commissions. Regulation is assumed to be less effective in these 
states. Thus, the model suggests that cost per unit of output 
should be lower in plants which operate in these states. Actual 
data consist of a dummy variable which takes on a value of one 
in states with commissions and zero in the states without com-
missions. 
Second, state commissions can be characterized as determin-
ing the rate base on an original cost basis or on a fair value 
basis. The former method uses the value of the firm's capital as 
it appears on the firm's books, while the latter gives recognition 
to increased capital costs over time and may be five to fifty 
percent higher than original cost. Eiteman and Stuart!3 found 
that when the rate base was adjusted so as to be comparable in 
II In [14]. 
12 In [IOJ. 
I" In [8] and [19], respectively. 
4. Data 
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these two types of jurisdictions, a higher rate of return was, on 
average, allowed in fair value states. The differential was statis-
tically significant. Thus, a second measure of "regulatory tight-
ness" adopted is division of plants which operate in fair value 
states from those which operate in original cost jurisdictions. It 
is assumed that fair value regulation is more liberal in terms of 
allowed profits. The theoretical model predicts that average cost 
and percentage of cost going to capital should be lower in plants 
operating in these states. Data assume the form of a dummy 
variable taking on a value of one in states with original cost 
commissions and zero for states with fair value commissions or 
no state commission. 
A third method of measuring regulatory stringency examines 
the return to equity capital. Because of the residual nature of the 
return to common stockholders, it is here that liberal or conser-
vative commission policies are most dramatic. In a rate case an 
overall return on the capital base is allowed. Out of this total the 
firm must meet its debt, preferred stock, and common stock 
obligation; and its legal priorities are in that order. Fixed debt 
and preferred stock interest and dividends must be paid before 
common stockholders can receive dividends. Because of this 
legal priority, a one-percent change in the overall rate of return 
has a multiplied effect on the return to equity. If the firm has 
fifty-percent common stock in its capitalization, a one-percent 
change in the allowed rate of return has a two-percent effect on 
the return to equity. Thus, it is on the common stockholder that 
"tightness of regulation" is really felt. 
The relationship between s - PK , the average allowed return 
minus the average cost of capital, and Se - Pe. the average 
return to equity minus the cost of equity, is just 
S - PK = (se - P e)(l - /3), where /3 is the percent of debt capital 
in the rate base. An index of Se - Pecan be derived based on 
the assumption that capital markets are efficient in their evalua-
tion of a firm's relative profitability. 
The value of a utility's stock at time 0 is given by the 
discounted value of the expected dividend stream, 
MVo = IDt/(l + Pe)l, (41) 
1=1 
where MVo is the price of the firm's common stock at time 0, D t 
is the dividend at time t and is given by the relationship 
Dt = DoO + g)f, where g is a constant rate of dividend growth.14 
If the rate of dividend growth is less than the cost of capital, 
then (41) becomes 
MVo = D 1/(Pe - g), 
which can be solved for Pe: 
P _ D1 
e- MVo +g. 
(42) 
(43) 
To return to equation (42), the dividend paid at time t is just the 
dividend pay-out ratio, d, times earnings per share for the 
14 This model of stock price valuation is found in most introductory finance 
texts such as Van Horne [20). 
period, EPSt • Earnings per share for the regulated firm are 
constrained to be less than or equal to the allowed return on 
equity capital, Se' times the total of equity capital, Xt, divided by 
the number of common shares outstanding, n. Hence 
MVo = d(seXo1n)/(Pe - g). (44) 
But Xoln is just book value of common equity per share, BVo. 
Substituting and solving for Se gives 
Se = MVo(Pe - g)ldBVo· (45) 
Substituting in the expression for P e of equation (43) gives 
Se = MVo(D!IMVo)ldBVo = D!ldMVo. (46) 
Thus, the difference between Se and Pe is given by 
(47) 
Equation (47) suggests that a continuous variable measuring 
regulatory stringency can be derived by using the firm's div-
idend, dividend pay-out ratio, book value of equity, stock 
price, and expected growth rate in dividends. It was previously 
noted that Se - P e should be adjusted for capitalization differ-
ences. The notation S S is u sed to denote S e - P e adjnsted for 
capitalization. The data used in determining SS are those for the 
firm owning the plant under observation. Firms which are part 
of interstate holding companies had to be eliminated when using 
this measure because the financial data necessary were not al-
ways available on a firm basis. Nine plants were excluded from 
the original sample for this reason. 
In the actual use of the data, the continuous variables were 
normalized to meet the specifications of Section 3. An exception 
is that of SS with several negative values for which the log is not 
defined. SS is used in linear form with mean equal to zero. The 
data are further discussed by Petersen in an earlier work.!5 
• The notation used in this section and the criteria for 
statistical significance of the coefficients are given in the Appen-
dix. The numbers in parentheses beneath the coefficients are the 
associated t-values. 
The unit cost regressions using REG and FAIR are carried 
out using a modified Cobb-Douglas functional form. Only the 
continuous variable, SS, is used to estimate the generalized cost 
function of Section 3. 16 
REG is significant at 0.01, but the FAIR variable is not 
significant. However, both coefficients are positive as predicted 
by the theoretical model. Firms in jurisdictions with state com-
missions and those in states with commissions setting the rate 
base on an original cost basis have higher unit costs. Unit costs 
1.; In [14J. 
16 SS as developed in Section 4 is not used simultaneously with REG and 
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in states with commissions are, on average, seven percent 
higher. 
Signs of other coefficients are consistent with a priori expec-
tations. Fuel, labor, and capital price coefficients are all positive 
and significant. Newer vintage plants have significantly lower 
costs. The coefficients of the quantity variables imply that aver-
age costs decrease with quantity out to a minimum of 4447 
million KWH. Only seven plants in the sample exceeded that 
level of production. 
Regression A 
LCaST' = -0.1717 + 0.0880NH - 0.1008LQ' + 0.0590LQ'LQ' 
(3.85) (-8.11) (8.42) 
+ 0.6237LF'+ 0.1784LL' + 0.2680LK' - 0.0189TC - 0.0006Y 
(15.26) (2.75) (2.18) (-4.45) (-0.06) 
+ 0.0701REG + 0.0013FAIR 
(3.04) (0.08) 
Number of observations: 168 
R2 = 0.82. 
Regression B uses the generalized cost function, but without 
the interaction terms of SS with LQ, LF, LL, and LK. The joint 
hypothesis that the coefficients of these terms are all zero can-
not be rejected. The computed F-statistic is 0.759. The critical 
value at 0.05 is 2.45. The hypothesis that the appropriate func-
tional form (when using SS) is a modified Cobb-Douglas, suoh 
as was used in Regression A, is, however, rejected. 
The effect of changes in SS on the log of costs is given by: 
dIne' = -3.627 - 550.2(SS'). 
dSS' 
(48) 
Equation (48) has a maximum at SS = -0.0066. In accor-
dance with the requirements of Section 3, SS was normalized to 
have a mean equal to zero. In terms of the original data, the 
maximum occurs at SS' = 0.005. Less than fifteen percent of 
the observations on SS do not exceed that maximum point. The 
result suggests that the cost inflating effects of regulation can be 
reduced if the firm is regulated very tightly, but such an interpre-
tation undoubtedly gives greater credit to the data and estima-
tion procedures than their precision would justify. The estimates 
do suggest, however, that as regulation tightens, costs 
increase-although evidently at a decreasing rate. 
For the other estimated coefficients of Regression B, all 
linear terms in input prices are positive and significant. Tech-
nology results in a decrease in costs, and the unit cost curve 
decreases to a minimum at 7358 million KWH. This level is 
greater than for all but three of the output observations. 
Regression B 
LCaST' = -0.0185 -0.1160LQ' +0.0409LQ'LQ' -0.0127TC 
(-7.81) (4.19) (-3.20) 
-0.OO20Y +0.5299LF' +0.3260LL' + 0.4088LK' -4.763LK'LK' 
(-0.23) (9.15) (4.79) (2.44) (- 3 .29) 
+ 0.8516LF'LF' + 0.6055LL'LL' + 1.704LF'LK' -1.277LF'LL' 
(4.04) (1.36) (2.76) (-4.69) 
+0.0846LF'LQ' -5.874LK'LL' +O.4lO2LK'LQ' +0.1943LL'LQ' 





Number of observations: 141 
R2=0.87. 
Turning to the percent of cost paid to capital, the basic 
estimating equation is (39). In actual practice, the Y and TC 
variables are included to allow for year-to-year and technology 
effects, and the NH variable to adjust for differences attribut-
able to holding companies. 
Using REG and FAIR, it is found that their coefficients are 
both positive and that of REG is significant at 0.01. Tighter 
regulation is associated with a greater proportion of cost going 
to capital. Looking at the other coefficients, both the linear and 
quadratic terms in quantity are significant. They suggest that 
there are savings on the use of capital in comparison to other 
inputs up to some point. The coefficient of the fuel price is 
negative and significant. The cost of fuel makes up a large 
component of total costs as found in the denominator of PC. 
The coefficient of the wage rate is positive and significant. This 
might be explained by substitution of capital for labor as wages 
increase, however previous studies such as that by Dhrymes 
and Kurz17 found little substitution between labor and capital. 
The capital price coefficient is negative but not significant. A 
possible explanation is that high rental rates on capital increase 
the cost of using a given amount of capital, but this is offset by 
substitution of other inputs (primarily fuel) as capital becomes 
more expensive. An interesting conclusion is that newer tech-
nology in a plant seems to have no effect on the share of cost 
going to capital. This suggests that technology has been neutral 
among inputs or at least for capital as compared to labor and 
fuel considered together. 
Regression C 
PC = -0.0502 - 0.0114LQ' + 0.0132LQ'LQ' - 0.1510LF' 
(-2.40) (4.89) (-9.63) 
+ 0.0675LL'- 0.0037LK' - .OO03TC - .0083Y 
(2.71) (-0.29) (-0.20) (-2.30) 
+ 0.0223NH + .0267REG + .0026FAIR 
(2.53) (3.02) (0.38) 
Number of observations: 168 
R2 = 0.49. 
When the continuous variable SS is used to determine the 
effect of regulation on the proportion paid to capital, the findings 
17 In [7). 
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are similar to those of Regression C. The signs of the quantity 
and input price variables are the same. Their magnitudes and 
t-statistics change quantitatively, but the comments made for 
Regression C still hold. SS is negative and significant at 0.01. As 
regulation becomes more stringent, the firm spends a greater 
fraction of total cost on capital. 
Regression D 
PC = -0.0036 - 0.0095LQ' + 0.0132LQ'LQ' - 0.1878LF' 
(-1.80) (4.62) (-9.09) 
+ 0.1023LL' - 0.0253LK' + 0.0013TC - 0.0090Y - 1.336SS' 
(3.53) (-0.41) (0.70) (-2.20) (-2.96) 
Number of observations: 141 
R2 = 0.50 . 
• The Averch-lohnson model provides analytical support for 
the proposition that rate of return regulation may result in 
inefficient production. In this paper the A-l model is reformu-
lated in terms of cost-minimization subject to the regulatory 
constraint. It is shown that as regulation tightens, that is, as the 
allowed return approaches the cost of capital, the firm has 
higher unit costs and spends a larger portion of total cost on 
capital. These two relationships are testable hypotheses of the 
revised A-l model. 
A general functional form is adopted for empirical analysis. 
This form does not put a priori restrictions on the coefficients of 
the cost function. The sample consists of steam generating 
plants which experience a large addition to capacity just prior to 
the sample period, 1966 to 1968. Three measures of regulatory 
policy with regard to the allowed return are used. The first is the 
dichotomy between firms operating in states with state commis-
sions and those without. The second is the separation of original 
cost from fair value rate base jurisdictions. It is assumed that 
regulation is more strict in states with state commissions and in 
original cost jurisdictions. The third measure is an attempt to 
measure the actual difference between the allowed return and 
the cost of capital. 
The evidence supports the hypotheses. Using both a 
modified Cobb- Douglas and the more general form of the cost 
function, it is found that as regulation tightens, unit costs in-
crease. The result is statistically significant using the state com-
mission versus no state commission dichotomy and also using 
the continuous measure of the allowed return minus the cdst of 
capital. It is also found that the percent of cost going to capital 
increases with more stringent regulation. This result is also 
statistically significant when the same two measures are used. 
In summary, the findings of this analysis are that the empiri-
cal evidence does support the Averch-lohnson contention. The 
conclusions here are also generally consistent with those previ-
ously reported by Spann and by Courville. Additional results on 
this topic and on other effects of regulation are presented in an 
earlier work of the author. 18 
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Log of unit cost of production. 
Percent of total unit cost going to capital. 
Year of observation. 
Index of technological change. 
Log of quantity produced. 
Log of annual wage rate. 
Log of capital rental rate. 
Log of fuel price. 
Dummy variable. Value equals one for firms under 
staie commission. 
Dummy variable. Value equals one for firms regu-
lated on an original cost basis. 
Allowed return on equity minus the cost of equity 
capital adjusted for capitalization differences. 
Dummy variable. Value equals one if firm is part of a 
holding company. 
Log of quantity times log of quantity. 
Log of quantity times log of wage rate. 
Log of quantity times log of fuel price. 
Log of quantity times log of capital rental rate. 
In general, products of two variables required by equation 
(38) are denoted by LiLj where Li and Lj are the respective 
variable names. The last four entrys in the column above are 
examples. 
Standard tests of statistical significance are used. In most 
cases a coefficient will be considered significantly different from 
zero if it passes a two-tailed (-test at an alpha level of 0.05. If the 
sign of the coefficient is given by the theoretical model or a 
priori expectation, then a one-tail test at 0.05 will be the criteria. 
References 
l. AVERCH. H. AND JOHNSON. L. L. "'Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory 
Constraint." The American Economic Review, Vol. 52. No.5 (December 
1962), pp, 1053-1069. 
2. BAILEY, E. Economic Theory of Regulatory Constraint. Lexington, Mass.: 
D.C. Heath, 1973. 
3. BARZEL, Y. "The Production Function and Technological Change in the 
Steam Power Industry." Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 72, No.2 (April 
1964), pp. 133-150. 
4. BAUMOL, W. AND KLEVORICK, A. "Input Choices and Rate of Return 
Regulation: An Overview of the Discussion." The Bell Journal of Economics 
and Management Science, Vol. I, No.2 (Autumn 1970), pp. 162-190. 
'" In [14]. 
TEST OF 
REGULATORY EFFECTS I 125 
126 I H. CRAIG PETERSEN 
5. CLARK, DODGE, AND COMPANY. An Outline of Electric Utility Regulation by 
States. New York, 1962. 
6. COURVILLE, L. "Regulation and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry." 
The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. I 
(Spring 1974). pp. 53-74. 
7. DHRYMES, P. J. AND KURZ, M. "Technology and Scale in Electricity Gen-
eration." Econometrica, Vol. 32, No.4 (July 1964), pp. 287-315. 
8. EITEMAN, D. K. "Interdependence of Utility Rate-Base Type, Permitted 
Rate of Return, and Utility Earnings." Journal of Finance, Vol. 17, No.1 
(March 1962), pp. 38-52. 
9. FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION. Federal and State Commission Jurisdiction 
and Regulation. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 
10. JORGENSON, D. W. "Capital Theory and Investment Behavior." The Ameri-
can Economic Review. Vol. 53, No.2 (May 1963), pp. 247-259. 
11. ---, CHRISTENSEN, L. R., AND LAU, L. J. "Conjugate Duality and the 
Transcendental Logarithmic Function." Stanford University Working Pa-
per, 1971. 
12. NERLOVE, M. "Returns to Scale in Electricity Supply," in C. Christ et al., 
Measurement in Economics. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1963, pp. 
167-198. 
13. PETERSON, H. C. "The Allowed Rate of Return vs. the Marginal Cost of 
Captial in a Public Utility Rate Case." #74-2, Center Study Papers, 
Economics Research Center, Utah State University, January, 1974. 
14. ---. 'The Effect of Regulation on Production Costs and Output 
Prices in the Private Electric Utility Industry." Memorandum No. /5/, 
Stanford University Center for Research in Economic Growth, Stanford 
University, September, 1973. 
15. PHILLIPS, C. F., JR. The Economics of Regulation. Homewood, Ill.: R. D. 
Irwin, Inc., 1969. 
16. RESCHENTHALER, G. B. "The Legal Background of Electric Utility Regula-
tion in Texas-An Economist's View." Baylor Law Review, Vol. 21, No.3 
(Summer 1969). pp. 295-304. 
17. SPANN, R. M. "Rate of Return Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An 
Empirical Test of the Averch-Johnson Thesis." The Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1974), pp. 
38-52. 
18. STIGLER, G. AND FRIEDLAND, C. "What Can the Regulators Regulate: The 
Case of Electricity." Journal of Law and Economics. Vol. 5 (October 1962), 
pp. 1-16. 
19. STUART, F. "Rate Base versus Rate of Return." Public Utilities Fort-
nightly, Vol. 70 (September 21, 1962), pp. 395-99. 
20. VAN HORNE, J. C. Financial Management and Policy. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971. 
